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ABSTRACT 
 
This study aims to understand whether the gender of mutual fund managers impacts investors’ 
capital allocation decisions to US mutual funds. This study uses net alpha as an indication of 
proper capital allocation, as higher net alpha indicates not enough capital, and uses value added 
(gross alpha multiplied by fund size) as an indication of skill, as higher value added indicates 
higher skill given that capital is allocated properly (Berk and van Binsbergen 2015). This 
research utilized the Morningstar database to gather information on 5,000 US mutual funds to 
compare net alpha and value added between male funds and female funds. The present research 
found that female managers have statistically significantly higher net alpha and higher value 
added, compared to male managers, likely indicating that females are not allocated enough 
capital but have higher skill, as they are able to extract high value added even without proper 
capital allocation.  
 
Keywords: Gender, Mutual Fund, Skill, Capital Allocation  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This study examines whether investors discriminate based on the gender of mutual fund 
managers when they allocate capital to mutual funds, by exploring differences in performance 
and skill among different groups of managers. The results of this study could help determine 
whether female-led mutual funds are an untapped opportunity for investors.  
 
Women are notoriously underrepresented in the financial sector, especially within mutual funds, 
even though females have long ago reached educational parity with males (National Center for 
Education Statistics 2013). It is important to understand (1) whether skill levels and fund 
performances differ between the genders and (2) whether investors are biased toward a particular 
gender because such information can shed light on the mutual fund industry’s practices and can 
help investors make better choices about what types of funds and what types of managers they 
should be investing with. 
 
Under efficient markets, if males and females have, on average, the same skill levels (i.e., 
managerial skill levels do not differ on the basis of gender), then female-led funds and male-led 
funds should be of equal size, on average (Pham 2015). This would mean they would show equal 
value added (i.e., gross alpha multiplied by fund size). However, there is a deep imbalance 
between the genders in the world of mutual funds – is this due to underlying factors that lead the 
genders to be fundamentally differently skilled in mutual fund investing, or is this due to societal 
norms and investor preferences toward male managers? 
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This research utilized the Morningstar database to gather information on 5,000 US mutual funds, 
and R software was used to run statistical analysis in order to determine whether there were any 
statistically significant differences between male funds and female funds in terms of net alpha 
and value added. Through this methodology, this research hoped to understand the gender 
differences in fund management to give managers and investors the most accurate perspective 
within the current climate of the mutual fund industry. 
 
The results of this study indicate the funds labeled as female had statistically significantly higher 
net alpha and statistically significantly higher value added when compared to funds labeled as 
male. Therefore, this study concluded that investors might hold institutional bias against females 
since females are not properly allocated capital, even though they show higher skill through 
higher value added. 
 
BACKGROUND THROUGH LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Economic Gender Inequality  
Gender inequality remains pervasive in the business world—the World Economic Forum 
estimates that it would take approximately another 80 years for women to achieve economic 
parity with men (World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report 2016). This figure comes 
as a shock to many, as economic parity remains far away even though women outpace men in 
educational achievements (National Center for Education Statistics 2013). In many parts of the 
world, men and women are at or near parity in health and education, but economic participation 
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and economic opportunities lag behind by about 20%, even in the most gender-equal nations 
(Tyson 2015). 
 
Such gender inequality is an important issue to solve because the growth benefits of unlocking 
the female workforce are significant: achieving gender parity in workforce participation rates 
would increase the GDP of developed nations by 12% and by an even larger percentage in 
developing markets (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Report 2015).  
 
Gender Inequality in the Financial Sector  
While this issue is prevalent across most parts of the international business world, women are 
especially and notoriously underrepresented in the financial sector. Fewer women participate in 
US fund management than do in heath care (37% of doctors are women), law (33% of lawyers 
are women), and accounting (63% of accountants are female) (Lutton 2015). In general, the 
financial sector seems to have a weaker professional pipeline for females, compared to other 
careers that require similar education, and this could be rooted in systematic biases (i.e., 
discrimination) against females (Lutton 2015). 
 
Half of the investment capital in the United States comes from women, but very few women are 
involved in managing the invested capital (Chadick 2009). Looking at the finance industry, about 
23% of investment bankers are female, which is a percentage that is among the highest in the 
industry (Alden 2014). Only about 12% of senior leaders at real estate firms and approximately 
11% of senior leaders at venture capital firms are women (Beltran 2016). These numbers 
dwindle further in other parts of the financial sector, as only 10% of mutual fund managers are 
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women, only 7% of buyout firm leaders are women, and only 3% of hedge fund managers are 
women in the United States (Beltran 2016; Chadick 2009). Males exclusively managed 74% of 
the finance industry’s assets, females exclusively manage 2% if the industry’s assets, and mixed-
gender management teams fill in the remaining portion (Lutton 2015).  
 
Financial institutions and funds have come under much public scrutiny in recent years due to the 
global economic crisis, and gender diversity could be tapped into as an important and impactful 
factor in changing and rebuilding the financial system. With this, this research posits that women 
represent a significant component of necessary talent to construct an effective, stable, and 
growing economic model and to build a trustworthy and sustainable financial system through 
new perspectives, diverse risk management styles, and high skill in asset management (Chadick 
2009). As result, if systematic discrimination is present, it is important to consider and resolve. 
 
Gender and Fund Manager Performance 
Much research has been done to study gender differences in fund managers’ risk tolerance and 
performance, due to the recently popularized idea that funds run by women tend to outperform 
funds that are run by men. According to a report put out by Rothstein Kass (now KPMG) in 
2013, funds managed by females showed an average return of 9.8%, while funds managed by 
men showed a 6.13% return on the HFRX Global Hedge Fund index (Jones 2014). Similarly, 
between January 2007 and June 2013, hedge funds managed by females exhibited an average 
return of 6%, while the HFRX Global Hedge Fund Index showed a loss of 1.1% and the 
Standard & Poor’s 500 index returned 4.2% within that timespan (Jones 2014)  
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However, such popular reports may not always be the most reliable in their research methods and 
in considering key factors. It is important to note that funds managed by females tend to be much 
smaller and more niche as compared to those run by men (Pham, 2015). Additionally, such 
studies focused solely on hedge funds, which have only 3% women, and looked only at returns 
without controlling for proper extraneous variables. 
 
Gender and Financial Investment  
After the popular studies of 2013 and 2014, researchers began to look into the question of gender 
in fund management further. Risk and performance metrics that cover one-year, three-year, and 
five-year horizons in U.S. mutual funds and hedge funds find that funds managed by women 
outperform those managed by men (Luongo 2011). Such findings also indicate that funds 
composed of an equal number of female and male managers are likely to lead to greater financial 
market stability, as a result of a favorable combination of risk tolerance preferences and 
investment strategies (Luongo 2011). Overall, it is striking that females remain significantly 
underrepresented as fund managers, even though they show quality performance. 
 
Unfortunately, such results are still questioned as other studies reveal that there is no gender 
impact on financial investment performance. Stepping beyond the United States and exploring 
the performance of 358 European diversified equity mutual funds, there were no statistically 
significant difference in performance as explained by gender when funds were evaluated against 
each funds’ designated market indices (Babalos 2015). However, males and females did exhibit 
different investment style consistency and risk factor responses (Babalos 2015). Further, a study 
of worldwide funds between 1994 and 2013 showed no difference in performance or risk 
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between all-female and all-male funds when matched by fund size, fund category, and year of 
observation (Aggarwal 2016) 
 
Even though these results differ from the Luongo (2011) study in the United States, such 
findings could have significant implications for fund managers and investors, as they set asset 
allocation strategies and pick management teams. However, all of these studies focused on 
returns as a measure of performance—Aggarwal (2016) essentially replicated the Rostein Kass 
(2013) study but controlled for proper variables to isolate impact on returns. Unfortunately, the 
aforementioned studies ignored the concept of fund manager skill due to their intense focus on 
fund returns and did not go further to test whether there has been discrimination against female 
fund managers by investors.  
 
Theoretical Framework: Manager Skill Level vs. Manager Returns  
The consideration of manager skill level is critical to evaluating mutual funds. The concept of 
skilled fund managers has been a contested idea among researchers—there is much debate about 
whether stock picking or market timing talent exists (Berk and van Binsbergen 2015). However, 
given that fund managers are compensated generously for their work, the lack of consensus on 
the existence of skill is concerning (Berk and van Binsbergen 2015). In theory, investors want to 
place money with the most skilled managers (Berk and van Binsbergen 2015). 
 
The question of assessing skill is complex. Some studies use net alpha (i.e., the average 
abnormal return net of fees and expenses) to assess manager skill (Carhart 1997). However, if 
the supply of skill is limited, then in equilibrium, net alpha is not determined by manager skill 
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and is instead determined by competition between investors, as higher skilled managers should 
demand higher fees (Berk and Green 2004). With that, gross alpha (the average abnormal return 
before fees are subtracted) may be a closer measure of managerial skill. However, gross alpha is 
still just a measure of returns as opposed to directly being a measure of value (Berk and van 
Binsbergen 2015). 
 
Value is associated with the amount of money extracted from financial markets by each 
manager, meaning that it must be a function of fund size. Therefore, in theory, holding fees 
constant, gross alpha can only differentiate managers if all funds are the same size, which is not 
the case, especially when comparing female funds and male funds (Berk and van Binsbergen 
2015). After all, a manager with a smaller alpha but large fund might add more value than a 
manager with a large alpha but small fund (e.g., 1% returns on $10 billion is large than 10% 
returns on $1 million) (Berk and van Binsbergen 2015). 
 
In a 2004 study, Berk and Green determined that there was no theoretical reason for gross alpha 
to be related to manager skill, and in 2015, Berk and van Binsbergen argued that “the skill of a 
mutual fund manager equals the value the fund extracts from markets” (i.e., the value added of 
the fund), which is the fund's gross return over its benchmark multiplied by assets under 
management. This measure of “value added” calculates the amount of money the fund obtains 
from financial markets without evaluating how the fund decides to distribute the money (Berk 
and van Binsbergen 2015). Thus, the measure is an indication of “the resulting product of all the 
skills used to extract money from financial markets” (Berk and van Binsbergen 2015).  
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However, fees between managers may vary, so looking at fund size may not tell the whole story. 
To analyze the theoretical framework to approach this problem, it’s important to hold certain 
assumptions constant: (1) investors are rational, (2) financial markets are competitive, (3) 
managers optimize, and (4) managers face decreasing returns to scale (Berk and van Binsbergen 
2014). Thus, gross alpha generated by an active manager is αi = ai – biq with ai as the alpha on 
the first cent that manager i actively invests, bi as a parameter that captures the decreasing returns 
to scale of manager i, and q as the amount of money manager i has under active management 
(Berk and van Binsbergen 2014). 
 
Under these assumptions, Berk and van Binsbergen (2014) introduce the following propositions: 
(1) net alpha does not measure managerial skill, (2) gross alpha only measures managerial skill if 
all managers set their fees to ensure that all funds have the same AUM, and (3) value added (the 
product of AUM and gross alpha) always measures skill. 
 
Net alpha is not a measure of skill because under the assumption that investors are rational and 
financial markets competitive, all mangers would have zero net alpha because non-zero net alpha 
investment opportunities would be competed away. Additionally, since mangers optimize, 
managerial skill follows the equation Vi = max [q(ai – biq)] with Vi as managerial skill, and the 
optimal amount the manager decides to actively manage is q = ai / 2bi. 
 
To illustrate these ideas, let’s assume that Manager A and Manager B are equally skilled, in that 
they both have equal gross alpha when given equal amounts of money to invest. As each is given 
more money to invest, gross alpha will decrease because investment ideas are limited so there are 
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decreasing returns to scale. Let’s assume that gross alpha is 1% for both managers with $100M 
assets under management (AUM), but gross alpha will decrease to 0% if an additional $100M is 
invested. If Manager A charges a fee of 1% and has a fund with $100M AUM, Manager A’s 
value added is $1M, and the total monetary fee collected by Manager A is $1M. As a result, 
Manager A’s net alpha is zero—Manager A is in equilibrium and will not receive more money 
from investors. Meanwhile, if Manager B charges a fee of .5% with the same skill as Manager A, 
Manager B will be given more money under perfect competition because Manager B’s net alpha 
will not be zero at $100M AUM. With the first $100M invested in Manager B, Manager B will 
generate a value added of $1M but will only receive $500K in fees—Manager B’s net alpha is 
.5%. As a result, Manager B may receive additional funds from investors in a perfectly 
competitive market. With another $100M, Manager B’s overall gross alpha will become .5% 
because (1) gross alpha was 1% for $100M out of the $200M AUM and (2) gross alpha was 0% 
for the other $100M out of the $200M AUM. Note that there is no value added on the funds that 
Manager B’s invested at 0% gross alpha. Manager B’s gross alpha becomes equal to the fees 
charged as fund size increases, but value added stays the same. 
 
Manager A and Manager B are equally skilled. In equilibrium, Manager A and Manager B have 
different gross alphas and different fund sizes because their fee structures differ. However, both 
investors have equal value added, illustrating their equal skill.  
 
In terms of value added, it is important to note that skill cannot be defined exactly by fund size—
having a large fund does not inherently imply skill. Instead, it is those managers with the highest 
skill that end up with the larger funds and reap the higher rewards (Lucas 1978). Managers need 
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to prove themselves with high alpha to attract investors, and those managers with the highest 
alphas should continue to receive more investments until the most skilled managers have large 
funds in a space with much competition between highly skilled managers (Berk and van 
Binsbergen 2015). 
 
Overall, the concept of skill is important because investors appear to be able to detect manager 
skill and use the information to invest their capital (Berk and van Binsbergen 2015). Managerial 
compensation is predominantly based on fund size, so investors effectively determine managerial 
compensation as they allocate capital to funds (Berk and van Binsbergen 2015). Thus, there is a 
“very strong positive cross-sectional correlation between managerial skill and managerial 
compensation,” suggesting that investors are able to deduce managerial skill, “as current 
compensation better predicts future value added than past value added does” (Berk and van 
Binsbergen 2015). However, if external factors besides pure managerial skill influence whom 
investors give money to, then there is potential for the existence of an untapped pool of skilled 
managers. In a perfect world, investors would give money to managers based on skill—
unfortunately, societal norms, industry pressures, and unconscious biases might sometimes keep 
people from acting perfectly rationally, thus keeping investors from funding highly skilled 
managers based on factors, such as gender, that are not merit-based (Dobbin 2011). 
 
The graph of Vi = q(ai – biq) and αi = ai – biq has the potential to show systematic discrimination 
– with the same αi line, two managers could have different Vi, showing that investors could be 
discriminating in terms of capital allocation to different, yet equally skilled, managers. Please see 
Figure 1. 
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The optimal value added is the max of Vi indicated in Figure 1. According to the theoretical 
framework laid out above, all managers that have their performance at αi = ai – biq (the blue line), 
should have fund size Q* with maximum value added. However, if there are managers that lie 
anywhere on the left side of the maximum point (e.g., one such point is indicated as sub-optimal 
value added in Figure 1), those managers are not getting the optimal capital allocation for their 
performance under efficient markets. Managers with fund size Q1 have higher current α but 
lower value added. 
 
Figure 1: Graph of Value Added and Alpha to Show Possible Discrimination  
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If females are significantly exhibiting sub-optimal value added while males are exhibiting 
optimal value added, there might be systematic discrimination in the market that impedes 
females from receiving the proper capital allocation from investors. As a result, the distance 
between average female fund size and average fund sizes can quantify the amount of 
discrimination in the market, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
The Present Study 
All in all, it is clear that female participation in the business world is still limited, and women 
continue to be largely underrepresented in the financial sector (especially in fund management). 
Such underrepresentation could potentially lead to an untapped pool of skilled fund management 
talent. After all, much work has been done to show the benefits of gender diversity in other 
business areas (e.g., the benefits of female CEOs or of having female representation on corporate 
boards), and recently, the idea of gender diversity benefits in fund management has become 
popularized.  
 
Unfortunately, much of the past research in this field has been questioned, as notable studies 
show conflicting results, ignore the question of manager skill, and do not address investor 
discrimination. It is further unclear if the phenomenon of higher female returns is restricted to the 
United States, if findings are credible due to the limited number of female-run funds, and if 
gender is the core driver of differences. 
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This research aims to determine whether mutual fund manager gender impacts (1) proper capital 
allocation to mutual fund managers and (2) manager skill in terms value added, as defined as 
gross alpha multiplied by fund size (Berk and van Binsbergen 2015). The objective of this paper 
is to compare female value added to male value added and understand if women who are skilled 
are likely to have smaller funds than men who are skilled because they are not afforded the same 
amount of capital from institutional investors. Therefore, the present research hopes to discover 
whether or not mutual fund manager skill level differs between the genders and whether or not 
investor bias against females exists in the mutual fund industry.  
 
This perspective is different from much of the past research in gender and mutual funds because 
much of the literature is primarily concerned only with the return an investor can earn by 
investing in a mutual fund. The Rothstein Kass (2013) study assessed skill by looking at fund 
returns without controlling for or acknowledging fund size, while Aggarwal (2016) controlled 
for fund size and acknowledged further extraneous factors but still solely assessed performance 
as fund returns.  
 
This research studies US-based mutual funds to see if there is evidence of skill differences 
related to gender (as shown in previous literature) using the concept of value added, ensuring that 
funds are assessed against a tradable benchmark and fund size is acknowledged as a function of 
skill. Additionally, this research would like to understand whether gender is related to the 
differing fund sizes between men and women (as opposed to the reason of skill) to further 
explore investor biases against female managers and potentially unearth an untapped talent pool 
of skilled managers. 
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Target Audiences  
The target audiences of this research are (1) investors (high net worth individuals, institutional 
investors, etc.) who are looking to invest in mutual funds, (2) mutual fund managers who are 
looking to expand their teams, and (3) college women considering post-graduation careers. 
 
Investors want the highest returns possible from the best, most highly skilled managers. Investors 
pick skilled managers and give them large sums to money to get large value added. However, if 
investors have just been giving money to highly skilled men, then there might be a pool of highly 
skilled female managers who are managing small funds and receiving returns that show high 
skill. Such research could be a call to action for investors to place their money with female fund 
managers, as these fund managers have the same skill as their male counterparts but have not 
been given the proper amount of invested capital and compensation. 
 
Additionally, given that females may be highly skilled at fund management, mutual fund 
managers who are incentivized to have the highest performing funds or funds with the highest 
value added would likely expand their talent search more deliberately.  
 
Finally, women are a critical audience because women are extremely under-represented in 
mutual funds. Very few women are involved in managing invested capital in the United States, 
and the financial sector seems to have a weaker professional path for females, compared to other 
careers that require similar education (Lutton 2015). As a result, understanding that women may 
be vital assets to fund performance may lead to improvements in the professional pipeline and 
give college women the confidence to pursue a career in fund management post-graduation.  
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HYPOTHESES 
 
The goal is this research is two-fold: (1) measure managerial skill level between genders in terms 
of value added and (2) measure institutional differences between female funds and male funds to 
understand investor decisions. As a result, the following null hypotheses are put into place. 
 
H01 = Females are equally as skilled as males when it comes to fund management in 
terms of potential value added  
 
H02 = Investors do not have any institutional biases between males and females, implying 
that when allocating capital investors assign the same amount of capital to male 
candidates and female candidates who have the same skill and charge the same fees 
 
This research hypothesizes that mutual funds managed by females will show higher returns than 
men when looking across all US-based funds (Rothstein Kass 2013; Jones 2014; Luongo 2011). 
However, with higher returns, this research hypothesizes that female funds will show lower 
value added because female funds are smaller than male fund (Pham, 2015). As a result, females 
might have higher net alphas as compared to men because they are not given enough investment 
capital to drive down their net alpha, and females might have lower value added because they are 
not given enough investment capital to extract larger value added or reach their optimal point of 
value added. In this outcome, the skill difference between males and females may be 
inconclusive, but it would be likely that investor discrimination may be the cause of not 
receiving enough investment capital. 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
The present research aims to determine whether mutual fund manager gender impacts mutual 
fund manager value added (skill) and understand investor decisions in terms of capital allocation. 
In order to determine if there is a relationship between gender and manager skill, as well as if 
there are fundamental differences between female and male funds determined by investor capital 
allocation, this research employed statistical methodology on available mutual fund data across 
time to compare (1) the net alpha and (2) the value added between female mutual funds and male 
mutual funds.  
 
Data was collected about (1) mutual fund manager gender from a variety of funds as well as 
about (2) fund annual returns, (3) fund management fees, and (4) fund size (AUM).  Data from 
live, US-based mutual funds was acquired from the Morningstar database. The data covered a 
span of time between 2006 an 2016. Morningstar also provided information on the 1 year, 3 year, 
5 year, 10 year, and 15 year gross alphas that were pre-calculated, as well as fund management 
fees, fund manager names, fund size, and fund annual returns for 5,000 mutual sub-funds. The 
entire database contains over 20,000 mutual sub-funds, but only the first 5,000 funds could be 
exported for analysis. 
 
Data regarding mutual fund managers’ gender was derived from searching each fund manager’s 
name (the names were given by Morningstar CISDM) on the fund website, Bloomberg, and/or 
LinkedIn (Aggarwal 2016). Managers were determined as female if they were addressed as 
“Ms.,” “Mrs.,” or “she.” Managers were determined as male if they were addressed as “Mr.,” or 
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“he.” The fluidity of gender was not addressed in this study, as prior research has kept gender as 
a binary variable and the data given did not require gender to be treated as non-binary.  
 
The gross alpha used in this study was calculated based on the funds’ annual returns. While 
Morningstar did give data regarding gross alphas for 1 year, 3 years, 5 years, 10 years, and 15 
years timeframes, Morningstar’s method of calculation is unclear so the pre-calculated alphas 
were viewed as unreliable. As a result, for this study, a separate gross alpha was calculated based 
on the annual return data Morningstar provided. In order to calculate gross alpha, returns from 
2006 to 2016 for each sub-fund were used. Plotting a regression of fund return minus the risk 
free rate for each corresponding year as the y-axis and market return minus the risk free rate for 
each corresponding year as the x-axis, gross alpha could be derived as the intercept of the 
equation. With this method, a gross alpha for each fund was generated, across the time period of 
2006 to 2016. However, some fund only included date for one or two years. In order to make 
sure all data was fairly comparable, only funds with all years of returns between 2006 and 2016 
were included in the statistical analysis, with all other funds excluded.  
 
It is important to note that funds managed by females are often much smaller and more niche as 
compared to those run by men (Pham, 2015). This research hopes to understand whether there is 
a persistent differences in (1) net alpha (i.e., gross alpha minus management fee) between male 
funds and female funds and (2) value added (i.e., gross alpha multiplied by fund size) between 
male funds and female funds.  
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Analysis Explanation 
This research considers US-only funds. Within the data from Morningstar, many of the separated 
funds were actually sub-funds of a larger firm. There were two possible routes for analysis: (1) 
treat each sub-fund as its own fund and (2) completely collapse sub-funds that were under the 
same firm name into one fund. In order to collapse sub-funds together, the weighted average, 
weighted by fund size, was calculated of the management fees and the funds’ gross alphas. The 
weighted average gross alpha was considered the new, larger fund’s gross alpha, and the 
weighted average management fee was considered the new management fee. The new fund size 
was the sum of the sub-funds’ fund sizes. 
 
It is important to note that not all funds had information on the returns between 2006 and 2016, 
so those funds were excluded from analysis. As a result, option 1 (using 5,000 sub-funds 
separately) only yielded 780 usable data points due to a significant amount of excluded funds. 
Option 2, unfortunately, did not yield enough data points for analysis. 
 
It was critical to determine which funds would be considered female fund and which would be 
considered male funds. Most funds in the dataset had multiple managers, and an insignificant 
number included all or a majority of female mangers. Therefore, funds were labeled as female 
funds if 10% of their fund managers were females—the statistical software only found a fair 
balance of female funds and male funds when 10% female was considered female. Funds with 
exclusively male managers were labeled as male. 
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Once funds were classified as either a female fund and a male fund, two t-test were run using R 
software: (1) average net alpha was compared between the male funds group and the female 
funds group to determine whether capital was allocated fairly and (2) average value added (gross 
alpha multiplied by fund size) was compared between the male fund group and the female fund 
group to show whether possible skill differences exist or if investor discrimination based on 
gender may be playing a role in sub-optimal value-added. Results were considered significant if 
the p-value derived from the t-test was less than .05 (i.e., p <  .05 means statistical significance). 
 
If investors are allocating capital to the best investors, those investors should have net alphas that 
are near zero and should have very high value added. However, if a specific group of managers 
has a higher average net alpha, those managers are likely not receiving the proper funds they 
deserve—one possible explanation for this would be discrimination. Thus, those managers who 
are not receiving the proper funds might have lower value added due to their smaller fund size, 
not due to real lower skill, because their value added is sub-optimal as they are prevented from 
having larger funds—their value added might be higher (and could reach an optimal level) if 
they were allocated more money by investors.  
 
Scenario Analysis of Possible Results  
There are nine possible scenarios of results. Please see Figure 2.  
 
Net alpha illustrates if capital is being properly allocated to managers. If a group has a higher net 
alpha compared to another group, that is a likely indication that investors are not allocating 
 22 
enough capital to the group with the higher net alpha—this indicates possible discrimination 
against the group with higher net alpha.  
 
Value added demonstrates skill. Higher value added often indicates higher skill, but given that 
discrimination in terms of capital allocation might be at play, a certain group of managers may 
be prevented from extracting their optimal value added since they are not given enough funds. If 
capital is allocated properly, higher value added should indicate higher skill. 
 
Figure 2: Explanation of the Nine Possible Result Scenarios   
Note: “alpha” means net alpha. “VA” means value added.  
 alphaFemale > alphaMale alphaFemale = alphaMale alphaFemale < alphaMale 
VAFemale > VAMale Females are not given 
enough capital but can 
still extract high value 
added, showing high skill 
(Discrimination against 
females) 
Females and males are 
both allocated capital 
fairly, and females show 
higher skill by extracting 
higher value added 
Females are likely allocated 
capital fairly, but skill is 
inconclusive (Possible 
reverse discrimination, as 
males might be prevented 
from extracting high value 
added) 
VAFemale = VAMale Females are not given 
enough capital, but males 
and females show the 
same skill (Possible 
discrimination, as females 
might be prevented from 
extracting optimal value 
added) 
Females and males are 
both allocated capital 
fairly and show the same 
skill level 
Females are likely allocated 
capital fairly, and males 
and females show the same 
skill (Possible reverse 
discrimination, as males 
might be prevented from 
extracting optimal value 
added) 
 
 
 
VAFemale < VAMale  
Females are not given 
enough capital, but skill 
is inconclusive (Possible 
discrimination, as females 
might be prevented from 
extracting high value 
added) 
Females and males are 
both allocated capital 
fairly, and females show 
lower skill by extracting 
lower value added 
Females are likely allocated 
capital fairly but do not 
extract higher value added, 
showing lower skill 
(Reverse Discrimination, as 
male are likely more skilled 
but not given capital) 
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RESULTS 
 
Looking at all 5,000 sub-funds separately, without grouping under the firm level, net alpha was 
statistically significantly larger for female funds than for male funds (n = 780, female mean = 
7.07, male mean = 5.27, p = 2.28e-06). This potentially indicates that females are not given 
enough capital because their net alphas are so high. Additionally, female funds showed 
statistically significantly higher value added as compared to male funds (n = 780, female mean = 
209,697,048,979, male mean = 44,004,869,481, p = 2.2e-16). This higher value added shows that 
females are likely more skilled than males since they are able to extract higher value added even 
while not receiving enough investment capital.  
 
Together, these two statistically significant results indicate that females are not given enough 
capital but can still extract higher value added, showing higher skill. Thus, it is possible that the 
reason that females are not receiving enough investment capital from investors is that investors 
might be discriminating against females based on gender, even when these female fund managers 
might be more skilled and extracting more value added than male fund managers. It is likely that 
gender is impacting investors’ capital allocation decisions.  
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CHALLENGES AND COVEATS 
 
While this study found statistically significant results, it is vital to wary of these conclusions and 
to not generalize these results fully to the overarching concept of gender. 
 
Small Percentage of Females 
First, only 10% of mutual fund managers are women in the United States (Chadick 2009). As a 
result, finding a sufficient sample that included a sufficient number of female funds within the 
proper timeframe proved challenging, especially since many of these women manage funds with 
a team of men. It is unclear if females are extracting higher value added or if it is the 
combination of males and females. This study did not include any female-only funds, and the 
only parameter to labeling a fund as female was that the fund’s management team was composed 
of at least 10% females. Perhaps when men and women manage a fund together, those funds 
should not be labeled as female since discrimination might not be as much of a factor when men 
are also present as the face of the fund. Additionally, perhaps it is diversity, not strictly gender, 
that leads to high value added and thus high skill.  
 
Self-Selection Bias in the Females who Manage Funds 
The results of this study show that females have higher skill than males, but this should not be 
generalized as a gender outcome—the takeaway might be that the women in the sample happen 
to be more skilled than the men in the sample. The takeaway cannot be that females, as a gender, 
are better at investing. There is a huge selection bias in the females that manage mutual funds—
very few females choose to work in finance and very few choose to stay within finance and make 
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it to high management levels. Given the industry, females are much more filtered than males, as 
it is likely that only the highest skilled of all females are mutual fund managers because there are 
so few of them.  
 
Small Sample Size Compared to the Universe of US Mutual Funds 
This research focused on past mutual fund data and employed statistical methods, so sampling 
was done by choosing data from databases. Various databases could have been chosen, but given 
the resources available, Morningstar was viewed as the best option. Unfortunately, Morningstar 
only allowed for 5,000 funds to be downloaded and analyzed, even though the actual universe of 
US mutual funds is at least five times larger. Perhaps if data could have been obtained for all US 
mutual funds, the results would have been more comprehensive. 
 
With that small number, the data was further narrowed because not all 5,000 funds could be 
used—4,220 funds were excluded because Morningstar did not include all the return between 
2006 and 2016 for those funds. After excluding so many funds from the sample, there were less 
data points (only 780). Results were significant with 780 data points, but the results cannot be 
fully compelling because they do not fairly represent the true, large number of US mutual funds. 
 
SIGNIFICANCE 
 
Understanding these effects could have significant implications for mutual funds, as investors 
decide which managers to invest with and as management teams for funds are created. If such 
research increases investment into female funds along with increasing gender diversity in funds, 
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it is possible that certain funds will be able to start extracting more value added with more 
capital, which could have positive effects on the global economy and financial system. 
 
From a more macro-lens, a significant increase in investment dollars given to female managers 
and an uptick in gender diversity among mutual fund management teams in the United States 
could be a crucial step in moving toward gender parity in the finance industry. While the world is 
still approximately another 80 years away from women achieving economic parity with men, 
such an increase in parity within a specific industry would bring us one step closer (World 
Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report 2014).  
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Future research could be done to more comprehensively and reliable find the answer to whether 
gender is related to investors’ capital allocation decisions. First, in the future, more mutual funds 
could be analyzed. A sample size of closer to 20,000 funds would be more accurate. Such a 
larger sample size could (1) allow for the collapsing of sub-funds under the firm level, to better 
reflect the structure of mutual funds and (2) include more females so that the definition of a 
female fund and a male fund could be clearer (and perhaps even a mix-gender fund category 
could be added). Additionally, in the future, interviews could prove interesting to provide a more 
holistic perspective on this research question. Interviews could be conducted, employing a semi-
structured method of interviewing, to question how industry professionals view and experience 
gender differences when managing mutual funds.  
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